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THE STRUGGLE OVER EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS
John C. Roberts∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The remarkable men who created our national Constitution created a system
of government consisting of three separate branches—each with discrete and
specified powers—designed to ensure that governmental power could not be
abused. That system has served us well, though it may seem cumbersome and is
not always wholly democratic. But in several crucial areas the Framers created
shared or overlapping powers between the two political branches. The precise
boundaries of that sharing between the President and Congress was left ambiguous,
giving rise to an enduring tension that has ebbed and flowed throughout our
history. One such area of shared power concerns waging war, where Congress was
given the power to declare war and to appropriate funds for its support, but the
President was appointed Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces. In the
twentieth century, Congress and the President sparred repeatedly over the ability of
the President to deploy military forces throughout the world without a declaration
of war. 1 The constitutional standoff has continued, and the resolution in each case
has remained firmly in the political arena.
Another such area is the appointment of federal judges and executive
officials, which was a highly divisive subject during the constitutional convention. 2
The debate revealed deep differences among the Framers on the role of the
President and the balance between the executive and legislative branches. The
result is an Appointments Clause that does not give full power over appointments
either to the President or to Congress. In a complicated structure, the President
nominates judges and Officers of the United States, but the Senate is given the
power to advise and consent to such nominations. Different constitutional
mechanisms govern the appointment of lesser governmental officials. Senate
participation in the two general types of appointments—federal judges and
∗ © 2014 John C. Roberts. Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law Emeritus, DePaul
University College of Law. I am indebted to Mark Giangrande of DePaul’s Rinn Law
Library for research assistance on congressional materials. While serving as General
Counsel to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services from 1977 to 1980, I
benefitted immeasurably from the guidance of both the Office of Senate Legislative
Counsel and the Office of the Parliamentarian.
1
On the war powers issue, see generally LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 284–301 (6th ed. 2005) (describing the history surrounding the President’s war
powers, including the President’s ability to declare war, military tribunals, the War Powers
Resolution, and related cases); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 4-6, at 657–70 (3d ed. 2000) (juxtaposing the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief
with Congress’s power to declare war).
2
See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 15–38
(2000) (describing the Founders’ varying positions on the Appointments Clause).
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administrative officials—arguably has different constitutional justifications. In the
case of federal judges, who are appointed for life, it is understandable and
appropriate that the two elected branches should share power to appoint members
of the third branch, which then operates largely independent of them.
In the case of executive branch functionaries—including members of the
cabinet, lower ranking officials, and more recently, members of a bewildering
variety of administrative entities—giving a veto power over such appointments to
the Senate stands in obvious conflict with the President’s constitutional duty to
take care that the laws passed by Congress are “faithfully executed.” 3 And
practically speaking, such a veto may prevent the President from choosing officials
to serve with him in carrying out what he sees as his popular mandate to govern the
country in line with his articulated policies. To make matters worse, some
important questions are left unanswered or ambiguous in the constitutional text.
Where is the line between “Officers of the United States,” which require Senate
approval, and lesser ranking officials, who do not? 4 Must the Senate explicitly vote
nominations up or down, or may it do nothing, and if so, what are the
consequences? 5 May the Senate by legislation constrain the President’s selection
by mandating certain qualifications? 6 Who may remove which officials, and on
what grounds? 7 Most importantly for this discussion, what can the President do
when he wishes to make an appointment but the Senate is not available to exercise
its constitutional consent power?
Given the President’s strong political and practical motivation to get on with
the day-to-day business of government and the Senate’s desire to preserve its
prerogatives against executive ambitions, it is not surprising that the appointments
process has been a source of constant struggle between the branches from the very
first Congress. 8 That struggle has been exacerbated not only by the ambiguities in
the constitutional text, but also by the enormous changes in the size and
complexity of government since 1789. As the President and Congress have battled
over nominations through the years, each has developed devices to give itself the
advantage, thus escalating the tension and ill feeling between the branches. The
struggle has reached a new level in the last fifty years, with the arguments resting
not only on political grounds, but also on constitutional ones as well. The
constitutional concerns have more recently centered on the Recess Appointments

3

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 158–61 (discussing the interpretations of “Officer
of the United States”).
5
See Mathew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 950–58 (2013).
6
See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 273–80.
7
The key case here is probably Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which dealt
with the constitutional status of the independent counsel. See generally TRIBE, supra note
1, at 680–99 (discussing Morrison v. Olson and the independent counsel statute).
8
The best overall survey is GERHARDT, supra note 2.
4
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Clause, 9 which allows the President to bypass Senate advice and consent by
making temporary appointments when the Senate is not in session.
This Article argues that the long-term struggle between the President and the
Senate over executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may be
approaching a point where the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed is significantly impaired. During the Obama administration, an
unprecedented number of judgeships and executive branch positions remain
unfilled, threatening the smooth functioning of government at an especially
demanding time. 10
Republican opposition is increasingly based on extraneous political issues, not
on the merits of each nominee. 11 Pervasive obstruction by the minority in the
Senate prevents action on nominations and forces the President to assert broad
powers under the Recess Appointments Clause to make temporary appointments.
Most importantly, two recent developments threaten to completely undo the
tenuous compromises that historically have been observed between the branches.
One is the assertion by the Senate that through its brief pro forma sessions during
longer periods of absence from Washington, it can completely negate the
President’s recess appointments power. The second is a recent decision by a panel
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that takes an extremely
narrow view of the Recess Appointments Clause, overriding a complex series of
interpretations shared by the executive and legislative branches that have allowed
the Clause to function in the modern administrative state. 12

9

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
For executive appointments, one-quarter of key policy-making positions remained
vacant after President Obama’s first eighteen months in office, and almost 20% remained
so after two years. WILLIAM A. GALSTON & E.J. DIONNE, JR., A HALF-EMPTY
GOVERNMENT CAN’T GOVERN: WHY EVERYONE WANTS TO FIX THE APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS, WHY IT NEVER HAPPENS, AND HOW WE CAN GET IT DONE 1–2 (2010). Senate
delays were a major cause. At the end of their first years in office, President George W.
Bush saw 8% of his nominees awaiting confirmation as compared with President Obama’s
20%. Id. at 9. In March of 2010, 217 nominations were pending in the Senate. Seventyseven had cleared committee and were awaiting floor action, including forty-four that had
been pending for more than a month. Brian C. Kalt, Politics and the Federal Appointments
Process, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (April 5, 2011), http://digitalcommons.law.msu.e
du/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1467&context=facpubs.
11
See also THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 98–100 (2012) (discussing the Republican tactic of blocking
judicial nominations even while acknowledging the competence and integrity of the
nominees).
12
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). Two other circuit panels, using somewhat
different reasoning than the D.C. Circuit, made similar rulings later in 2013 by divided
votes. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co., 722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013); NLRB v. New Vista
Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013).
10
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If the Senate minority continues to obstruct even routine executive
nominations, and if the courts essentially eliminate the President’s recess
appointments power, the country will face a dangerous shift in the constitutional
relationship between the branches. These two recent developments make it urgent
to address the struggle over appointments and to restore a workable balance of
power between the President and the Senate. This Article attempts to outline the
nature of the crisis we face in more detail and to propose a course of action for the
future. Because the appointment of federal judges presents a somewhat different
set of issues, the discussion focuses on appointments to executive branch positions
requiring Senate advice and consent. Now numbering well over one thousand,
these positions include cabinet and subcabinet officials, as well as administrators
working in a variety of both departmental and independent agencies and
commissions. 13 The men and women who occupy them direct the thousands of
offices around the country that profoundly affect the lives of individual citizens,
along with their businesses and civil institutions. To Americans in their daily lives,
these men and women are “the government.”
In what follows, Part II identifies the structure, background, and history of the
Recess Appointments Clause, and Part III examines the threat to effective
governance posed by recent legal and political developments. Part IV provides an
analysis of legal issues raised by the Senate’s practices and recent court decisions
on recess appointments. Part V outlines recommendations for restoring the balance
between the branches on executive appointments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Structure and Background of the Appointments Clause
To resolve the important issue of which branch of government would control
the appointment of judges and executive officials, the Framers opted for shared
power between the President and the Senate and created three different methods of
appointment. 14 For “Officers of the United States,” which were not defined in the
text of the Constitution, the President was given the power to nominate and the
Senate the power to advise and consent, which is also not further delineated in the
text. For inferior officers, Congress may by legislation choose the method of
appointment, which might be by the President alone or by cabinet officers or other
high-ranking officials, all without individual approval by the Senate. “Advice and
Consent” was generally interpreted as “approval” from the beginning and is now
generally referred to as “confirmation.” The third method of appointment was
intended to deal with the situation where the President needed to appoint an
Officer of the United States, but the Senate was not available to perform its
constitutional role. Because Congress’s workload was light and travel to and from
13

See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 917 (2009).
14
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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the capital was difficult, it was expected that Congress would meet for short
working sessions followed by long recesses as members returned home. Under
those circumstances, some additional mechanism was clearly necessary. Thus, the
President was given the power in the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint
officers during Senate recesses, to serve only until the end of the following session
of the Senate. 15
Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist #76 that the Senate was
expected to be deferential in exercising its confirmation power, presumably
because of the President’s role as executor of the laws, and would only reject
nominations for “special and strong reasons.” 16 He and other Framers made it clear
that the Recess Appointments Clause was included to ensure that important
judicial and executive positions did not remain unfilled during breaks in the
Senate’s work and that the important day-to-day functioning of government would
continue. 17 This attitude reflected the general concern among the leaders of the day
that the lack of a strong executive function under the Articles of Confederation had
been a major cause of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the national government
before the Constitution was adopted. 18 The temporary duration of recess
appointments, on the other hand, preserved the essentials of the Senate’s approval
power.
It is important to note that the Framers used terms such as “recess,” “session,”
and “adjournment” in the Constitution but did not define them in its text. Then, as
now, these words are not terms of art but have vague and varied meanings. The
Framers had experience with state legislatures in which the terms were used and
unfortunate memories of the chaotic and ineffective Confederation Congress, 19 but
they left the job of defining these key terms on which the Appointments Clause
depends to a Congress that had yet to be elected. They even explicitly granted the
exclusive power to create procedural rules to the House and Senate separately. 20
Thus, those who wrote the Recess Appointments Clause had no way of knowing
exactly how it would work because the key terms were yet to be defined and their
meanings could be changed by the Senate over time. Fearing the kinds of
15

Id. cl. 3.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
17
THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t might be necessary for the
public service to fill [vacant positions] without delay . . . .”); Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d
1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (describing “what we understand to be the main
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause—to enable the President to fill vacancies to
assure the proper functioning of our government”).
18
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 131–35 (2005);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 547–53
(1969).
19
A principal motivation behind the 1787 Constitutional Convention was frustration
over the dysfunction and powerlessness of government under the Articles of Confederation.
See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1799–1805 (2003).
20
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5–6.
16
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attendance problems they had encountered under the Articles, they adopted only
one specific requirement—that the Congress meet at least once each year, no later
than the first Monday in December. 21
B. Historical Evolution of the Appointments Clause
Though the text of the Appointments Clause might suggest that it is a neutral
housekeeping provision, appointments were controversial and highly political from
the very first Congress. 22 The power struggle we now discuss was present from the
beginning, and both sides sometimes acted from political motives divorced from
the qualifications of the nominee. President Washington’s effort to appoint John
Rutledge to the United States Supreme Court was only the first example.23 The rise
of contentious political parties, which the Framers did not take into account, made
matters worse. Though the level of conflict rose and fell over the years, there were
periods of intense controversy over appointments, especially after the Civil War. In
the twentieth century, we saw profound changes in both the presidency and the
Senate, which must be taken into account in giving modern meaning to the Recess
Appointments Clause.
The early executive branch was tiny by today’s standards. 24 We now have
many more cabinet departments, along with myriad executive agencies and offices.
Since the New Deal, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of independent
administrative agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board,
which wield important quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers pursuant to
delegations from Congress. That factor alone has raised the stakes in the
appointments process because Congress seeks to control some of the power it has
given away by influencing the appointment of members of commissions and
agencies. It has attempted to exercise its power not only through its approval of
individual nominations, but also by vastly increasing the number of lower ranking
officials whose appointments require Senate action. There are fourteen advice-andconsent appointees in the EPA alone. 25 Likewise, the high turnover of cabinet and
subcabinet appointees in modern times places additional strain on the appointments
process.
It seems indisputable that the power of the presidency has increased greatly
since the founding period, adding to concerns in Congress over erosion of its
influence. Whatever the causes and contours of this accretion of power, it is a
21

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. The annual meeting date was changed to January 3 by
constitutional amendment in 1933. U.S CONST. amend. XX, § 2.
22
See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 45–77.
23
Id. at 51–52. Professor Gerhardt notes that a minor executive nomination by
President Washington was rejected barely three months into the first session of the first
Congress, apparently because Senators from the state preferred another candidate. Id. at
63–64.
24
See O’Connell, supra note 13, at 922–23.
25
Id. at 931.
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reality. Commentators have cited the President’s power over the policy choices of
key agencies and commissions, the concentration of power in the large White
House staff, the use of executive orders to essentially bypass the legislative
process, the acceptance of executive agreements as an alternative to treaties, and
the President’s crucial daily access to the media to push his policy agenda. 26 All of
these factors, and more, add up to an increasing threat to the power of Congress
and play a part in the escalation of obstruction in the Senate since 1980.
The modern Senate is also a different institution than it was when the first
Congress met, and these changes have dramatically affected the struggle over
executive appointments. In many ways, the Senate plays a different role than that
envisaged by the Framers. It is much more activist and more powerful, moving
from its primary role of protecting the interests of the states. The early Senate was
very small and operated like an intimate private club composed of the leading men
of the day. Today’s Senate has one hundred members, elected directly and highly
varied in experience and outlook. The work schedule of the Senate has also
evolved from the one anticipated by the Framers—short sessions followed by long
recesses each year. Members of the Senate and the House can now travel to and
from their home states with ease. Accordingly, they meet for longer sessions with
many short breaks interspersed. From 2001 to 2010, for example, the Senate was
actually in session about 45% of the time, with recesses averaging eighteen days,
with the longest fifty-six days. 27 Internal Senate rules and practices have also
evolved significantly over time. Unknown in the early Senate, the filibuster is now
a commonplace parliamentary device that has come close to paralyzing the body. 28
The Senate also allows holds on legislation and nominations by individual
members 29 and traditionally requires consultation (if not more) with home state
senators on many judgeships and executive nominations. 30 There is much greater
control of the advice-and-consent process by Senate committees and with that
comes much deeper scrutiny of nominees’ policy positions and backgrounds. 31
In the aggregate, these changes in the Senate have made it much more
difficult and time-consuming for the President to obtain approval of executivebranch nominees. By far the most important change in the culture and operation of
the Senate in recent years, and the change that most severely affects the struggle
over appointments, is the unprecedented increase in political polarization that has
26

The literature on presidential power is enormous. A useful summary of current
issues involving increased presidential authority is Developments in the Law—Presidential
Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (2012).
27
Kalt, supra note 10, at 2 n.16.
28
See generally John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2189 (2013) (discussing the use of Senate rules by the minority to create gridlock in
Washington).
29
Id. at 2196.
30
See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 143–54.
31
See G. Calvin Mackenzie, The State of the Presidential Appointments Process, in
INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 1, 40–44 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 2001).
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occurred since the 1970s. 32 Most issues are now defined by sharply contrasting
party positions, discipline is rigid, and compromise is very difficult to achieve.
Each side sees the other as not just mistaken, but evil or immoral, and the rhetoric
is increasingly sharp. Coupled with the many and varied weapons for minority
obstruction available to senators, this development has drastically altered the
appointments process, creating a situation that those who adopted the
Appointments Clause would not recognize.
The great majority of executive-branch nominees have always been approved
eventually because most do not present momentous issues from the Senate’s point
of view. 33 But this fact masks the ominous changes that have taken place in recent
years. Since about 1980, we have seen increasing conflict between the President
and the Senate on nominations to sensitive agency positions, subcabinet positions,
and even on some seemingly unimportant posts. 34 At first these refusals to confirm
came in the regular order after a negative vote on the Senate floor, presumably as
the Framers envisaged. At the same time, Congress expanded the number of
positions requiring Senate confirmation and deepened its scrutiny of nominees’
backgrounds and finances. More recently, however, the Senate has exercised its
confirmation power without a floor vote, either by lengthy delay, which resulted in
a withdrawn nomination, or by minority obstruction of a final vote by either a
filibuster or the threat of one. 35 This has led modern presidents, beginning with
Ronald Reagan, to increasingly use recess appointments to overcome the Senate’s
new tactics and to interpret broadly the recess appointments power. 36 Most
recently, as we shall see in an examination of President Obama’s disputes with the
Senate, the minority in that fiercely polarized body has begun to block votes on
nominations for reasons completely unrelated to the merits of the nominee. 37 Some
of these acts of obstruction have grown out of opposition to the policy directions of
32

See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2190.
One study places the “failure rate” for executive nominations, including negative
votes, withdrawals, and expired nominations, from 1885 through 1996 at 4.4%. Nolan
McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch
Nominations, 1885–1996, 43 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1126 (1999).
34
See Mackenzie, supra note 31, at 19–27 (2001); Burdett Loomis, The Senate: An
“Obstacle Course” for Executive Appointments?, in INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED, supra
note 31, at 160, 163–68.
35
See Mackenzie, supra note 31, at 31–36.
36
The Congressional Research Service has reported that presidents from Ronald
Reagan through Barack Obama have made 652 recess appointments, about evenly divided
between inter-and intrasession appointments. President Reagan made by far the most—
232—and President Obama (as of 2013) by far the fewest—thirty-two. HENRY HOGUE ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE NOEL CANNING DECISION AND RECESS APPOINTMENTS
MADE FROM 1981–2013, at 4 tbl.1 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/m
020413.pdf.
37
See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, The Senate as A Black Hole? Lessons Learned from the
Judicial Appointments Experience, in INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED, supra note 31, at 173,
176 (“Senators themselves will often admit that their willingness to delay a presidential
nominee has little to do with the qualifications of the nominee.”).
33
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the agency or department involved or from a desire to use the nomination process
to prevent entirely the operation of the agency. Senators also have increasingly
blocked nominations to extract unrelated concessions from the President. These
motivations would surely have seemed unacceptable and unwise to those who
devised the appointments process in the first place. Since in all the recent examples
it was clear to observers that a majority of the Senate would vote in favor of the
nominee if a floor vote were permitted, these minority tactics have become so
blatant as to trigger threats of revising Senate rules either to restrict or eliminate
filibusters and individual holds. 38
In sum, the current state of the appointments process seems far from that
envisaged by Hamilton and his contemporaries. Even so, neither the White House
nor the Senate has resorted to every possible tool in the struggle over executive
nominations, probably out of fear that at some point a constitutional crisis could
result. Until recently the rival branches have recognized the high stakes involved,
particularly in making or blocking recess appointments, and have stepped back
from the brink of confrontation. Good examples include the informal
understanding in 1960 that the President would not make recess appointments to
the Supreme Court 39 and more recent agreements by presidents to refrain from
making recess appointments in exchange for up-or-down votes on pending
nominees. 40 But the struggle over executive appointments, which has been slowly
evolving in seriousness over time, but also moderated by mutual restraint, has now
reached the point of crisis.
III. THE THREAT TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
Even before the events of 2012 and 2013 that brought to a head the continuing
struggle over executive appointments, scholars and political observers became
increasingly concerned that a general breakdown in the appointments process had
38

A major effort was mounted by reformers, backed by Majority Leader Reid, to
restrict filibusters at the start of the 113th Congress in January 2013. Minor modifications
were made. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2213–14. A more serious effort, focused on
restricting filibusters only for executive-branch nominations, was made in July 2013 and
resulted in a number of confirmations but no permanent changes in rules or practices. See
David Hawkings, Consumer Bureau Gets a Leader, and Dodd-Frank Gets an Enforcer,
ROLL CALL (July 16, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/hawkings/consumer-bureaugets-a-leader-and-dodd-frank-gets-an-enforcer/; The Editorial Bd., The Senate Clings to the
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/opinion/the-s
enate-clings-to-the-filibuster.html.
39
See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 18145 (1960) (passing a resolution that recess
appointments to the Supreme Court should not be made except under “unusual
circumstances”). Presidents have not made recess appointments to the Supreme Court since
and only rarely to lower federal courts.
40
For a review of some recent political accommodations on recess appointments, see
LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31112, RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 9–13 (2001); Patrick Hein, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The
Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 235, 252–56 (2008).
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begun to seriously impair the efficient operation of the executive branch. Political
Science researchers pointed out that since about 1980, delays in the confirmation
process had resulted in an ever-increasing percentage of unfilled positions both in
departmental offices and independent regulatory agencies. 41 Several causes were
identified, including expanded ethics screening, greater financial disclosure, and
disorganization in the White House personnel offices, but a major cause of
vacancies was surely procedural delays in the Senate. 42 Compounding the trend
was the significant expansion of the number of positions requiring Senate
confirmation, a result of legislative changes aimed at increasing Congress’s control
over executive policymaking. Minority obstruction made it increasingly difficult
for a President to staff his administration even during periods when the presidency
and the Senate were in the same hands.
Ronald Reagan’s use of recess appointments stands as a useful illustration of
the increasingly polarizing confrontation between the President and the Senate.
Because of obstruction in the Senate, he resorted to a large number of recess
appointments to independent agencies, allowing him to put into place his
deregulatory policy regime. 43 Recess appointments, which can last up to two years
in the right circumstances, were particularly effective tools because appointees to
such agencies usually serve for a relatively short period even when they receive
regular appointments approved by the Senate. The trend continued in subsequent
administrations, but use of recess appointments aroused much more controversy as
the Senate saw its influence over agency policymaking eroding. President George
W. Bush eventually stopped making recess appointments because of intense Senate
opposition and new parliamentary tactics, including the first use of pro forma
sessions. 44
During the period after 1980, we saw many more examples of action by the
Senate to obstruct or disable executive policymaking through refusal to confirm
key nominees. Democrats used such tactics against the second President Bush, 45
and Republicans accelerated them during the Obama administration, slowing down
banking regulation by refusing to confirm key Treasury Department officials 46 and
refusing to vote on Elizabeth Warren’s nomination to head the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 47 Both parties stubbornly refused to act on
nominations to the Federal Election Commission and the National Labor Relations
41

By one estimate, 8% of total nominees were pending action in the Senate at the end
of George H.W. Bush’s first year in office, compared to 20% at the end of Barack Obama’s
first year. GALSTON & DIONNE, supra note 10, at 9.
42
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 94–98.
43
See HOGUE ET AL., supra note 36, at 5–12 (noting President Reagan’s seventy-two
intrasession recess appointments and 160 intersession recess appointments).
44
See Ryan C. Black et al., Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing
Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 570,
580–81 (2011).
45
Id.
46
See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–97.
47
See id. at 99–100.
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Board (NLRB) because of disagreement about the mission of those agencies.
Senators even began to block nominees because of completely irrelevant
disagreements with the President or even with their colleagues. 48 Such practices
raise serious constitutional questions since refusal to act by the Senate in those
instances is based not on the merits of the nominees, as contemplated originally by
the Framers, but on an effort to disable the office or agency involved or even to
pursue a selfish personal or political goal. As the Supreme Court held in INS v.
Chadha, 49 Congress may not act in ways that have the effect of legislation without
following the procedure laid down in Article I—passage of a bill by both houses
followed by presentment to the President. 50 When the Senate refuses to confirm
any nominee to head the CFPB because it disagrees with its statutory mandate or
blocks any appointment of assistant secretaries charged with implementing
banking reform in order to prevent that reform, it is arguably overstepping its
constitutional authority; its proper alternative is to amend the relevant statute.
These tactics are even more constitutionally suspect because they are frequently
not acts of a Senate majority, but are the result of minority obstruction through
threatened filibusters, again not a tactic that would have been within the
contemplation of those who wrote the Constitution.
The President has alternatives to move forward with his policy initiatives and
carry out legislatively mandated programs without achieving Senate confirmation
of his nominees. He can use recess appointments, and has been increasingly driven
to do so, but such appointments increase the conflict with the Senate and so may be
politically undesirable. Moreover, they are temporary solutions. He may also use
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to appoint acting officers from within the
executive branch, though the Act does not apply to independent administrative
agencies. 51 Scholars have pointed out that, aside from the political risks, these
alternatives create officeholders who lack the gravitas or political credibility of
confirmed appointees and, thus, impair the operation of the offices involved. 52
Presidents have increasingly resorted to another tactic to get around Senate
obstruction by creating shadow officers within the White House, with titles such as
Coordinator or Czar, who effectively control an office or agency without being
appointed or confirmed. 53 Ironically, this cycle of obstruction followed by
presidential avoidance measures actually decreases the Senate’s influence over the
executive branch. The more that important offices and agencies are run by officials
48

See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 85 (“In February 2010, Senator
Richard Shelby of Alabama put a blanket hold on all White House nominations for
executive positions (over seventy were pending at the time) in order to get two earmarks
with tens of billions of dollars fast-tracked for his state.”).
49
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
50
Id. at 953–56.
51
Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d (2012).
52
See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 13, at 937–46 (explaining that the costs of such
alternative appointments include “agency inaction, confusion among nonpolitical workers,
and decreased agency accountability”).
53
See id. at 930–31.
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with recess or acting appointments not involving the Senate, or even worse run
unofficially by White House staff, the less power the Senate has to influence them
through the normal course of committee hearings and confirmation interviews. The
Senate’s current tactics then have the perverse effect of lessening its influence over
the bureaucracy and ultimately increasing the power of the presidency.
We come then to the events of 2011 and 2012 that escalated the conflict
between President Obama and the Senate over several key appointments, leading
to the controversial use of pro forma sessions to block recess appointments and to
the D.C Circuit’s decision in the Noel Canning case. 54
Despite Barack Obama’s decisive victory in the 2008 election and
comfortable Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, the new
President experienced unprecedented problems with executive appointments from
the beginning of his administration. Republican Senators, manifesting the extreme
partisanship and polarization that had been growing in Congress, vowed to block
the President’s policies at all costs and rejected talk of compromise. In the midst of
the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression, minority senators used
holds and threatened filibusters to delay over one hundred subcabinet and agency
nominations. 55 Though the administration also deserves some blame for the
slowness of its selection and vetting process, minority senators were mostly
responsible for keeping positions unfilled or filled with acting officers. The new
administration, as a result, faced the largest percentage of its advice-and-consent
positions unfilled after one year as compared with previous ones.56 In a number of
cases, minority obstruction was based not on doubts about the qualifications or
suitability of the nominee, but on a desire to cripple the office or agency involved.
This was especially true for Treasury subcabinet positions. As the President and
his Treasury Secretary struggled with measures to stabilize the banking system and
stimulate the economy, minority senators who opposed the administration’s
economic policies used the appointments process to try to cripple the Treasury
Department. 57 When nominations finally made it to the floor of the Senate, the
approval vote was overwhelming, demonstrating the real motives behind minority
delaying tactics. This blatant misuse of the constitutional advice-and-consent
power, in which a minority of senators actually wielded the power, came to a head
in 2011 when the Senate minority resolved to prevent two entities established by
Congress—the CFPB and the NLRB—from carrying out their statutory
responsibilities. President Obama’s attempt to resolve the conflicts through the use
of recess appointments, and thus fulfill his constitutional duty to execute the laws,
and the Senate’s effort to thwart him, brought about the appointments crisis the
country now faces.
The NLRB, a five-member independent regulatory agency charged with
carrying out the nation’s labor laws, has long been a center of appointments
54

Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–100.
56
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–97.
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controversies between the political parties. 58 Each is concerned that the other’s
nominees will tilt the Board too far in favor of labor or management. Not
surprisingly, five of the last seven appointments to the NLRB have been recess
appointments, as presidents were unable to achieve Senate confirmation of their
choices. 59 But in 2011, an unprecedented situation threatened to destroy the agency
entirely. The Board had been reduced to only two members for over two years, and
the Supreme Court ruled that two members were not enough to conduct official
business, casting doubt on countless decisions already made. 60 President Obama
thus faced an emergency. Senate obstruction had succeeded in crippling the Board
completely. In order to pursue his administration’s labor policies, and to carry out
its statutory responsibilities, the President was forced either to resort to the Recess
Appointments Clause or to allow this important agency to lie dormant in the face
of a number of adjudicative and regulatory imperatives. The President chose to
make three nominations to the Board in 2011, but the Senate took no action on
them. 61 Nearing the end of the session, the Senate scheduled a recess from
December 20, 2011, to January 23, 2012. The Unanimous Consent Agreement
which governed the break specified that brief pro forma sessions, at which only a
few senators would be present, would be held every three days, including on
January 3 when Congress was constitutionally required to meet to open the new
session. 62 The Agreement specified that “no business” would be conducted during
the pro forma sessions. On January 4, 2012, now in the second session, the
President appointed his three earlier nominees to the Board through recess
appointments, allowing them to serve for almost two years until the end of the next
session. The validity of the appointments was challenged in federal court later in
2012 by a business that had been subject to a decision made by the newly
constituted Board. A panel of the D.C. Circuit eventually held the recess
appointments unlawful on broad grounds in early 2013, but did not decide the
narrow question of the constitutional effect of pro forma sessions to block recess
appointments. 63
The second appointments controversy in 2011 involved the President’s efforts
to put in place a director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB),
created by the Dodd-Frank law designed to prevent a repeat of the banking crisis.64
Minority Republicans in the Senate had opposed this new agency, seeing it as
another layer of bureaucracy burdening the banks. The President’s desire to
58

Until this year, most of the recent appointments to the Board have been recess
appointments. For a useful procedural history, see TODD GARVEY & DAVID H. CARPENTER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43030, THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS POWER AFTER NOEL
CANNING V. NLRB: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 8 (2013).
59
Id. at n.51.
60
New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 686–87 (2010).
61
GARVEY & CARPENTER, supra note 58, at 7–9.
62
157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011).
63
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d. 490, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
64
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012)).
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appoint Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard Law professor who had played an important
advisory role in creation of the agency, was thwarted by minority opposition. He
responded by appointing her to the role of consultant to the Treasury Department,
where the new bureau resided, which further angered Republicans.65 In May 2011,
forty-four Republican senators signed a letter opposing the appointment of any
head of the CFPB, regardless of qualifications, until changes were made in its
governing statute, making it clear that they would use the appointments process for
purposes unrelated to the merits of the nominee. 66 In July, the President nominated
Richard Cordray to head the CFPB. 67 Cordray, a widely respected former Ohio
Attorney General, garnered praise from both parties in the Senate, but the minority
still vowed to oppose his confirmation. The relevant Senate committee approved
Cordray’s nomination, however, and in a test vote to bring his nomination up for a
floor vote, he received fifty-three votes. 68 Since the Senate’s rules required sixty
votes to overcome a filibuster, the nomination failed. Once again, the spirit of the
Appointments Clause was openly violated. Faced with potentially being unable to
fully implement a key element of Dodd-Frank, the President responded by making
Cordray a recess appointee in January, at the same time as his NLRB nominations.
Partisan debate and scholarly discussion over executive nominations
continued throughout the first half of 2013, and further minority obstruction
occurred—nominations of new heads for the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Labor Department became stalled, along with the perennial case of the
head of the Justice Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) and several other nominations. Majority Leader Reid raised the
stakes by threatening to invoke the “nuclear option” (sometimes called the
“constitutional option”) to change Senate rules so as to prohibit filibusters on
executive-branch nominations. This tactic has been tried in the past, usually with
the aim of more general filibuster reform, and often results in compromise by the
minority to avoid a rules change. And so it was in July 2013 when, at the last
moment, Republicans agreed to allow votes on Cordray and other pending
nominees. 69 As to the NLRB nominees, the President agreed to withdraw the
nominations of the two members whose nominations had been declared invalid in
Noel Canning, but Republicans agreed to immediately process and allow votes on
two new nominees, bringing the NLRB to full strength. Even the ATF, which had
never had a confirmed head since the office was upgraded to advise-and-consent
status seven years before, was included in the package and its nominee was
confirmed. This compromise, however, did not end the partisan controversy.
65

Ms. Warren was also appointed Assistant to the President. Amelia Frenkel, Note,
Defining Recess Appointments Clause “Vacancies”, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 729, 731 n.10
(2013).
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44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, SHELBY.SENATE.
GOV (May 5, 2011), http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/44-u-s-sens-to-obam
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157 CONG. REC. S4646 (daily ed. July 18, 2011).
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157 CONG. REC. S8429 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011).
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See supra note 38.
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Further obstruction in late 2013 led the majority to exercise the “nuclear option” to
curtail filibusters on most nominations. 70 This development, however, will not end
the struggle over executive nominations. Parliamentary warfare will continue and
may even escalate. Delay tactics using Senate rules and traditions are still available
to the minority. More importantly, constitutional issues involving the Recess
Appointments Clause remain unresolved, to be addressed by the Supreme Court in
the 2013–14 term.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause
The current dispute over the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, and
thus the balance of power between the President and the Senate in the struggle over
executive appointments, revolves largely around a choice between originalist and
functionalist interpretations of the constitutional text, and over the role of historical
practice in constitutional interpretation. The Noel Canning court took a narrow
originalist approach, parsing the words of the text and discounting historical
practice. Those who favor a broader interpretation emphasize the ambiguities of
the text, the overall purpose of the Clause, and a generally uniform view of
presidential practice over much of our history. Advocates of the broader approach
have included most modern commentators, and until recently, all the federal courts
that have addressed the issue. 71 They have argued that the Appointments Clause is
inherently political and must be approached with its principal purpose in mind—to
ensure the smooth and sustained functioning of the national government in all its
vast and varied fields of responsibility. They have also recognized the overriding
importance of the President’s duty to execute the laws duly passed by Congress.
We turn now to those interpretive issues.
70

See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most
Filibusters on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-p
recedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html; Niels Lesniewski, Democrats go “Nuclear,” Eliminate Filibusters on Most Nominees, ROLL CALL (Nov.
21, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/democrats-go-nuclear-elim inate-filibus
ters-on-most-nominees/. Tellingly, press reports noted that when the Senate finally acted to
curtail confirmation filibusters, 189 executive nominations were pending action in the
Senate. Philip Rucker et al., White House, Allies Weigh Nomination Strategy Under New
Senate Rules, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white
-house-allies-weigh-nomination-strategy-under-new-senate-rules/2013/11/22/31664534-53
8e-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.html.
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For commentators, see, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III
Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2005); Patrick Hein,
supra note 40. For courts, see infra note 79. In Evans v. Stephens, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that it was “the intent of the Framers to keep important offices filled and government
functioning.” 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (2004).
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The text of the Recess Appointments Clause is as follows: “The President
shall have the Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.” 72 For purposes of this Article, there are two phrases that bear crucially on
the relative powers of the President and the Senate in the context of recess
appointments—“Vacancies that may happen” and “during the Recess of the
Senate.”
Almost from the beginning, there have been two competing views about the
“may happen” language. The most obvious interpretation would seem to require
that a resignation, removal, or death of an officeholder requiring Senate
confirmation must actually take place while Congress is not in session, but it
quickly became apparent that the obvious interpretation creates both practical and
political difficulties. It means that a vacancy-causing event that occurs during the
last days of a Senate session could not be filled by recess appointment, despite the
fact that the recess then following could be as long as nine months under early
practice. There was also the occasional problem of determining exactly when a
resignation or death had occurred. Those who see the language as ambiguous argue
that “happen” can refer to a continuing state as well as a single occurrence. The
first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, took the narrower view, 73 but early
presidents and other formal Attorney General opinions advocated the “happen to
exist” interpretation of the text. They argued that the actual event causing the
vacancy could occur while the Senate was in session, and since it also continued to
“exist” during the subsequent recess, the President could make a recess
appointment. In the face of an ambiguous text, they relied on the purpose of the
Clause—to keep the government functioning smoothly despite the Senate’s
meeting schedule—observing that the harm done by a vacancy was the same
regardless of when it technically occurred. Presidents Adams, Jefferson, and
Madison made recess appointments to fill vacancies that originated while the
Senate was in session. 74 Scholars have debated the exact time this interpretation
attained broad acceptance, but there was little contrary argument after Attorney
General Wirt’s opinion to that effect in 1823. 75 The Congress itself clearly
accepted it as well, as exemplified by the Pay Act in 1863, 76 which assumed that
the “happen to exist” interpretation was valid but restricted the pay of such recess
appointees. In fact, subsequent amendments to the Pay Act have actually
broadened the types of recess appointees who could be paid. 77 Further acceptance
72

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments, in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 165–67 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990).
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Hartnett, supra note 71, at 387–401. Greater doubt exists about the status of
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Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631 (1823).
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The original version of the Pay Act was an appropriations rider. Act of Feb. 9,
1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642, 646 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2012)).
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of the broader view of the recess appointment power can be found in the
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, which included several charges
involving appointments and removals, but no mention of his recess appointments
made under the “happen to exist” interpretation. 78
Though the few court challenges that have occurred resulted in decisions
accepting the broader interpretation, 79 the D. C. Circuit in the Noel Canning case
adopted the strict view that vacancies eligible for recess appointments must occur
when the Senate is in recess. 80 The panel majority relied heavily on dictionary
definitions of “happen” and the early Randolph opinion and downplayed the
importance of subsequent practice. 81 This interpretation, if it prevails on review,
would seriously curtail the President’s recess appointment power. Particularly if
combined with a narrow view of what constitutes a recess, the result is that the
President will have fewer opportunities to overcome the kind of obstruction and
parliamentary maneuvering that has caused our current appointments crisis. It
would demand exquisite timing by the President to ensure that resignations occur
during a recess and would eliminate the current practice of a resignation followed
by a nomination, with the recess appointment of the same person occurring at the
next recess only if the Senate fails to act in a timely fashion.
The second key phrase involved in interpreting the Recess Appointments
Clause is “the recess of the Senate.” One view, adopted by the Noel Canning court,
is that the phrase refers only to so-called “intersession” recesses, the ones that end
an annual session of the Senate. 82 On this view, the terms “recess” and “session”
are mutually exclusive, and there is only one of each during a particular year. The
broader view, taken by courts and long practiced by presidents and congresses, is
that “the recess” refers to the time the Senate is in recess, not to any particular
recess. Thus, in modern times when the Senate takes numerous shorter
“intrasession” recesses throughout the calendar year, the President may make
recess appointments during each of them.
There are numerous problems with the narrower view that only intersession
recesses may trigger the recess appointment power. As a textual matter, it rests
almost entirely on the Framers’ use of the definite article “the” to restrict recesses
to the single intersession recess that they might have been familiar with. But it is
78

Hartnett, supra note 71, at 409.
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 944 U.S. 942
(2005); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
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Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Judge Griffith did not
join in this portion of the opinion, given the long-standing acceptance of the “happen to
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not difficult at all to imagine that the Framers might have meant the phrase to
mean “the period in which the Senate is in recess,” allowing for more than one
recess in a year’s meeting of the Senate. Use of the narrower meaning was not
universal in legislative bodies of the period—Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation, for example, uses “the recess” in a more general sense. 83 And
“session,” whose meaning is inextricably linked to “recess” in the narrower view,
is not always used in the Constitution to mean only the annual meeting required by
the Constitution. In both the Adjournment Clause and the Speech and Debate
Clause, it clearly seems to have the more general meaning of any session. 84 More
importantly, commentators who take the restrictive view, and the Noel Canning
court, tend to ignore two important points. First, that the Constitution left to each
house of Congress the power to control its procedures, and therefore to give
meaning to “recess” and “session” in actual practice. 85 The Framers must have
been aware that they were using terms that they did not define and that could
change over time. Second, Congress did in fact have more than one session per
year quite often in its early years—the very first Congress had three sessions, not
two, and some later congresses had as many as five. 86 Many early congresses had
more than one intersession recess during a calendar year. Thus, there was no such
thing as the recess even in the early years. While Congress, up until the Civil War,
usually followed the original practice of having one short session and a long recess
each year, it increasingly added short “intrasession” recesses as well, especially
around the holidays in December. 87 The first intrasession recess appointment was
probably made in 1867, though such appointments were not always accurately
recorded in those years. 88
In short, the use of originalist arguments in the case of parliamentary terms
like “recess,” “session,” and “adjournment” in the Constitution simply does not
83

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The united states in
congress assembled shall have the authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of
congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’ . . . .”). The Confederation
Congress was required to meet at least once every six months. Id. at para. 7. It, in fact, had
a chaotic meeting record because of its onerous quorum requirement. See id.
84
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 4. (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”); U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses . . . .”).
85
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. I have written at length elsewhere about the importance
of the Rulemaking Clause as interpreted by the federal courts. See John C. Roberts, Are
Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers,
and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 522–43 (2001).
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Dates of Sessions of the Congress, Present–1789, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate
.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
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Id. at 408–09 (noting that three of President Johnson’s recess appointments were
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make sense since they depend on the developing parliamentary practices adopted
by the Senate over time. In fact, the meaning of “recess” and “session” are now
quite confusing, as the Senate’s definitive procedural guide and a recent
Congressional Research Service analysis show. 89 There are several different uses
for the term “recess.” Most importantly, the Senate distinguishes between “daily
recesses” and “annual recesses,” only the latter being breaks in the annual session
of Congress. 90 Senators commonly speak of being “in recess” overnight or on
weekends when the Senate is in session, but those are only daily recesses, and no
president has asserted the power to make recess appointments in those
circumstances. The Senate can either recess or adjourn at the end of a day, and the
two terms have different parliamentary implications.91 The key term “adjournment
sine die” is usually reserved for the end of an annual session, but is not always
used. The very first Congress, which included many of those who were present at
the Philadelphia Convention, did not adjourn sine die (often appearing as “without
day”) at the end of its first session on September 29, 1789, but rather to a date
certain the next January. 92 The same is true of its second session, which ended on
August 12, 1790. 93 The first five congresses, in fact, adjourned sine die only at the
end of their two-year elected life, which then was the March following a
November election. 94 The practice of inconsistent use of sine die adjournment to
end annual sessions continued throughout our history. Whatever may have been
the original expectations of the Framers, given this ambiguity and confusion, it is
clearly illogical to hold on to a meaning of “the recess” that has no basis in reality.
The Senate went its own way in defining and labeling its various sessions.
Certainly the Noel Canning court’s reliance on sine die adjournment as the
touchstone for triggering the recess appointment power is artificial in the extreme
and exalts form over substance. Though intersession and intrasession recesses are
functionally identical, under the recent circuit courts’ reasoning, if the Senate
never adjourns sine die, there can never be recess appointments regardless of the
length of the Senate’s absence.
Given the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, it is clear that
distinguishing between intersession and intrasession recesses for purposes of
defining the President’s ability to make recess appointments makes no sense. If the
89
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goal is to ensure that important government offices keep functioning without
interruption, then the type of recess that causes the problem is of no relevance.
While intersession recesses are usually longer, intrasession recesses in the
twentieth century have been as long as four months. 95 Distinguishing between the
two types cannot be made based on their duration. Do we really believe that if the
Framers had foreseen the Senate’s increasing use of other recesses throughout the
year, they would have confined the recess appointment power to only one type?
Because intrasession recesses were not common until the twentieth century,
except for the traditional holiday break, the President’s power to make recess
appointments during those periods was not an issue in the early years. Attorney
General Knox’s opinion in 1901 relied on the definite article “the” in concluding
that only intersession recesses triggered the President’s power. 96 Attorney General
Daugherty’s 1921 opinion took the broader view, relying on the overriding purpose
of the Clause, and that position has been followed uniformly since—until Noel
Canning. 97 Presidents, aware that pushing the broader definition too far could lead
to an all-out war with the Senate, have generally used restraint and have not made
recess appointments during recesses of less than ten days. Again, there is strong
evidence of congressional and judicial concurrence. A 1905 Senate Judiciary
Committee Report on recess appointments did not distinguish between the two
types of recesses, adopting a practical set of tests as to when the President could
make recess appointments—basically defining “session” by whether there was a
duty of attendance and whether the Senate had the ability to participate as a body
in confirming nominations. 98 That test still appears in the definitive Senate
handbook on procedure. 99 Likewise, in the Pay Act Congress conceded the validity
of intrasession appointments. Adding to the argument for congressional
acquiescence, a 1948 opinion of the Comptroller General, an arm of Congress,
acknowledged the propriety of intrasession recess appointments and found that the
Pay Act permitted payment to those who are appointed “during periods when the
Senate is not actually sitting and is not available to give its advice and consent in
respect to the appointment, irrespective of whether the recess of the Senate is
attributable to a final adjournment sine die or to an adjournment to a specified
date.” 100 The first federal court to address the question was the Eleventh Circuit in
2004. In Evans v. Stephens, 101 the court upheld an intrasession recess
appointment. 102 The point seemed settled until the recent decisions of panels of the
D.C., Third, and Fourth Circuits.
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This Article cannot do justice to the many scholarly commentaries that have
delved into the Framers’ original understandings and to the complicated
parliamentary issues involved. 103 But it ends this discussion with some general
conclusions. First, the text of the Recess Appointments Clause is genuinely
ambiguous as to the two phrases discussed above. Second, purely originalist
arguments, especially as to the meaning of “recess,” are of little usefulness since
Congress can and did change its meeting habits over time. Third, intersession and
intrasession recesses are functionally identical and cannot logically be treated
differently for recess appointment purposes. Fourth, the President, Congress, and
the courts have long acquiesced in a practical structure for recess appointments
that, while it may be different from that anticipated by the Framers, carries out the
purpose of the Clause and balances the prerogatives of both branches. The Noel
Canning opinion, if upheld on review, would drastically upset that balance and
significantly curtail the President’s recess appointment power. And if the Supreme
Court were also to uphold the validity of the Senate’s pro forma session in
blocking the President’s appointment power, an issue not reached by the panel in
Noel Canning, the recess appointments power could be extinguished altogether. It
is to that issue that we now turn.
B. The Pro Forma Session
As noted above, the efforts of a minority of senators to block any appointment
of a director of the CFPB and to cripple the NLRB by denying it a quorum of
members came to a head in January 2012 when President Obama made recess
appointments in both cases. In this situation, however, the Senate took an
additional, and controversial, step to prevent the appointments—it employed socalled pro forma sessions in an effort to nullify the President’s recess appointment
power.
Pro forma sessions occur when a single senator in the chair gavels the Senate
into session, usually for only a few seconds, and then immediately adjourns it
without conducting any business. Such sessions are often used in cases where the
House has not consented to the Senate’s recessing for more than three days, since
the Constitution explicitly prevents either house of Congress from recessing for
more than three days without the consent of the other. The Senate sometimes uses
a pro forma session to extend a weekend recess for the same reason, to permit a
cloture vote to ripen, or for other internal parliamentary purposes. 104 The critical
question raised by the recess appointments of January 2012 is whether the pro
forma session may be used to prevent the President from making such
appointments.
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In this case, the motives of the minority in the Senate, particularly in the case
of the Cordray nomination, were clear. As noted above, they announced that they
would block any nominee to head the CFPB. More generally, twenty GOP senators
wrote to the Speaker in May 2011 urging the House to refuse to agree to an
adjournment of the Senate for more than three days. 105 In June of 2011, almost
eighty House members asked the Speaker to take “all appropriate measures . . . to
prevent . . . the Senate from recessing for the remainder of the 112th Congress” to
help the Senate minority block recess appointments. 106 These actions raise the
interesting question of whether the House was attempting to intrude itself into the
appointments process in contravention of the constitutional scheme. At the very
least, they show dramatically how the struggle over executive appointments has
now escalated beyond anything the Framers might have imagined.
The facts of this particular recess illustrate clearly the artificiality of
distinguishing between intersession and intrasession recesses for purposes of
recess appointments. The Senate adopted a Unanimous Consent Agreement on
December 17, 2011, specifying that it would adjourn at the end of the day, and
convene for pro forma sessions only “with no business conducted” every three
days until January 23, 2012. 107 Those pro forma sessions included one on January
3, the day established by the XX Amendment for the start of the second session of
the 112th Congress. If we take seriously the Senate’s assertion that pro forma
sessions are valid, there was no intersession recess in this case, the first session
ending and the second session beginning simultaneously. But the entire period
involved, thirty-seven days, closely resembled a typical intersession recess. The
Senate did not adjourn sine die in this instance, though the effect is exactly the
same as if it had.
The President chose to make his recess appointments after January 3, of
course, because that would make them intrasession appointments and the
appointees could then serve until the end of the first session of the 113th
Congress—almost two years. Had he made the appointments in late December,
they would also have been intrasession appointments, but his appointees would
only have been able to serve until the end of the new session beginning January 3,
2012, a little over one year. The President made his recess appointments on
January 4, 2012, when the Senate was not in either a regular or pro forma session,
but either in a three-day or a twenty-day intrasession recess. If the President may
validly make recess appointments during a three-day intrasession recess, then the
pro forma issue is irrelevant since there is no question that the Senate was in a
three-day recess on January 4. If the President may make recess appointments only
during intrasession recesses of more than three days, then the validity of the
105
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appointments turns on whether a pro forma session can interrupt a longer
intrasession recess. The President asserts, backed by an opinion of the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 108 that pro forma sessions are not
valid sessions for recess appointment purposes and, therefore, cannot interrupt a
longer recess. If this is correct, then he has made an intrasession recess
appointment during a twenty-day recess—between the start of the second session
of the 112th Congress on January 3 and the end of the Senate’s recess on January
23. His assertion of recess appointment power in this case would then be quite
conservative, falling well within the recess period during which other presidents in
the twentieth century have made intrasession appointments. The OLC opinion, in
fact, takes no position on whether the President may make recess appointments
during a three-day recess. 109
Pro forma recesses to prevent recess appointments were first used in 2007 by
the Democratic majority in the Senate to block recess appointments by President
Bush, and the tactic was successful in that it deterred the President from attempting
recess appointments. 110 Unanimous Consent Agreements providing for pro forma
sessions explicitly stated that they were for the purpose of preventing recess
appointments. 111 It may seem surprising, however, that Majority Leader Reid
would use the tactic again against a president of his own party beginning in 2010.
The fact that he did may reflect to some extent an aversion to recess appointments
even by presidents of one’s own party. But in this case the Majority Leader was
put under intense pressure by the House and by minority threats in the Senate to
hold up other business. Thus pro forma sessions were employed throughout 2010
and 2011. 112 Only frustration over the minority blocking of the functioning of the
CFPB and the prospect of a completely powerless NLRB led the President to act in
January 2012. Even so, one could view the President’s actions as conservative
since he only acted on this one occasion and focused only on two cases of clear
obstruction of his duty to execute the laws.
On the first question, whether the President may make intrasession recess
appointments during a three-day recess of the Senate, there is no judicial
precedent, and scholarly opinion is divided. 113 The main argument against such
appointments is that the Adjournment Clause demonstrates that the Framers did
108
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not consider recesses of three days or fewer to be constitutionally significant, 114
and even Attorney General opinions over the years have equivocated on this
question. While the two clauses are not related and have different constitutional
purposes, they provide a convenient way of establishing a lower limit on the
President’s power, once it has been established that intrasession recesses can
provide opportunities for recess appointments. A powerful argument for
recognizing a three-day limit as legally significant is that, as we have noted, it is
deeply imbedded in Senate rules and traditions and in the very definition of annual
recesses. As a policy matter, the danger of long vacancies in offices has receded as
a justification for recess appointments over the years, but allowing them during
one- or two-day recesses seems to push that argument dangerously far. Modern
presidents have as a practical matter conceded this point by generally not making
recess appointments during recesses of less than ten days. A court that upheld the
validity of intrasession recess appointments but rejected the validity of pro forma
sessions might well decide to leave the question of the lower limit to political
accommodation between the Senate and the President.
The OLC memo argues forcefully that a pro forma session of only a few
seconds, during which there is no quorum of senators present (and often none other
than the chair), is not a session for purposes of interrupting a longer recess because
the Senate was not capable of considering and acting on nominations. 115 It rests on
the terms of the Unanimous Consent agreement, which state that no business will
be conducted, and on the fact that no business was in fact conducted after January
3. It lays particular stress on the 1905 Judiciary Committee definition of when the
Senate is in session for purposes of the recess Appointments Clause:
It was evidently intended by the framers of the Constitution that [the
word “recess”] should mean something real, not something imaginary;
something actual, not something fictitious. They used the word as the
mass of mankind then understood it and now understand it. It means, in
our judgment, . . . the period of time when the Senate is not sitting in
regular or extraordinary session as a branch of Congress, . . . ; when its
members owe no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty; when,
because of its absence, it cannot receive communications from the
President or participate as a body in making appointments. 116
This definition appears in the Senate’s official parliamentary manual and has
been relied on as its own way of defining a session since 1905. 117 It rests on the
common sense idea that the body during a pro forma session is not capable of
exercising its advice-and-consent power; since it conducts no business, it cannot
debate or vote upon nominations. It also by definition cannot meet the requirement
114
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of the Constitution and of Senate rules that a majority of senators must be present
to conduct business. 118 Therefore, pursuant to the purpose of the Recess
Appointments Clause, the President may act to prevent harmful official vacancies
under his take-care duty.
There are a number of other indicators that pro forma sessions are not real
sessions for purposes of recess appointments. They include the senators’ habit of
referring to the whole period as a recess, and the fact that presidential messages are
commonly not laid before the Senate during pro forma sessions but are entered into
the Congressional Record only after the end of the whole recess period. 119
Likewise the entire period appears in the official record of the Senate as one
recess, not as a series of short three-day recesses. It is true that by subsequent
unanimous consent the Senate could conduct business during a pro forma session
and that it occasionally does so—for example, passing a bill that had been earlier
agreed to or taking some minor administrative action. In this instance, however,
the Majority Leader announced explicitly that no business was to be conducted,
and no business was actually conducted from January 3 to January 23. It is also
true that Senate committees can and do meet during recesses to consider
nominations. 120 Logically, however, it should not matter that the Senate could
potentially meet and consider a nomination during a pro forma session since that
potentiality is also present during any recess. No one has argued that the
President’s recess appointments power may not be exercised during a six month
intersession recess because the Senate could change its mind and come back early
to act on a nomination. Such an argument would entirely negate both the letter and
the purpose of the Clause. In the end, there is one crucial fact—a quorum of the
Senate was not sitting on January 4 to debate and vote on the President’s nominees
and did not assemble for business until January 23.
The crux of the President’s argument, therefore, is that while the Senate could
constitutionally preclude any recess appointments by actually remaining in session
throughout the year—in the sense that a quorum is present and official business is
conducted—it may not block the President’s power by pretending to be in session
when it is not. The argument seems compelling. If pro forma sessions were valid to
block recess appointments during what would otherwise be a recess, then the
President’s power to make recess appointments even during months-long recesses
would be negated, surely disrupting the balance established by the Appointments
Clause.
V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE BALANCE
We can see now that two sets of developments threaten to bring about a
constitutional crisis over the President’s appointment of executive officers. On the
one hand, internal Senate practices increasingly allow inordinate delay and
118

See U.S. CONST. art I, § 5.
See OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 4 & n.5.
120
See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 89, at 404.
119

750

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

obstruction, often by a minority of members and over issues unrelated to the
nominee. On the other hand, the President’s use of temporary recess appointments
to counter such tactics is threatened by narrow court interpretations and pro forma
sessions of the Senate. Unless change occurs on one or both of these fronts, the
President’s duty to execute the laws will be seriously impaired. If Senate
parliamentary reforms allow more speedy and orderly disposition of nominees on
the merits, then a narrowing of the recess appointments power may not be fatal.
Likewise, if the President is granted wide recess appointment power, then Senate
obstruction is not as alarming a problem (though it still has serious consequences).
Ideally, change should take place on both sides of this crucial equation. We turn,
then, to specific steps that can be taken to restore the proper balance between the
President’s prerogative to staff his administration and take care that the laws are
faithfully executed and the Senate’s rightful advice-and-consent role. All three
branches must participate in a solution.
The Supreme Court has a major opportunity to redress the balance in the
struggle over executive appointments, since it will review the D.C. Circuit’s Noel
Canning decision, including the pro forma session issue not reached below. 121 The
Court could simply reverse on the grounds that the respective powers of the
President and the Senate present a political question unsuited to judicial resolution,
but that course is both unlikely and unwise. Genuine textual constitutional issues
are involved. Likewise, the Court should reject the argument that the Rulemaking
Clause prohibits any judicial challenge to the Senate’s recess and adjournment
practices. Under the Court’s precedents, that is clearly true of rules and practices
which involve purely internal workings of the Senate, but not those, like the onehouse legislative veto, which affect the workings of the executive branch.122 The
use of a pro forma session solely to avoid triggering the recess appointments power
seems clearly in the latter category. So, while the Court could not prohibit the use
of pro forma sessions by the Senate, it could hold that such sessions do not
interrupt a period of recess for purposes of recess appointments.
The Supreme Court’s analysis should begin with a recognition that the
original practical purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause in 1789 has become
irrelevant in the twenty-first century and indeed started to become irrelevant in the
first Congress. There is no longer any danger of federal offices going vacant for
long periods because of Congress’s meeting schedule. But even in the early years,
presidents and senators began acting for political and tactical purposes, changing
the original function of the Clause. With the rise of polarizing political parties and
the great growth of government, the focus by the mid-nineteenth century was more
on instances where the Senate was reluctant or unwilling to confirm nominees, not
where it was unable to. Hamilton’s comment that the purpose of recess
121
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appointments was to allow the President to make appointments to his
administration where “the general method was inadequate” 123 should now be
viewed in a new light—the method is inadequate today not because the Senate is
absent for long periods during the year, but because mindless obstructionism has
prevented the regular appointments process from working as it was intended.
Moreover, the advice-and-consent power was effectively wielded over the past
several years by a minority in the Senate, something the Framers surely would not
have countenanced.
Both the President and the Senate have acted in ways arguably divergent from
the original intent, often in reaction to moves by the other. But the overriding
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is still the touchstone—efficient
functioning of the executive branch and fulfillment of the President’s duty of
executing the laws passed by Congress. Thus recent Senate efforts to thwart the
Treasury’s regulation of banks in the financial crisis, its effort to strangle the CFPB
by refusing to confirm any director, and its complete crippling of the NLRB,
present the same dangers to efficient government as did the Senate’s absence from
Washington for nine months in 1790.
To those who might argue that the broader reinterpretation of the Recess
Appointments Clause is an impermissible revision of the constitutional text, I
would point out that the Senate has already accomplished such a revision of its
confirmation power by adopting rules and practices that allow a minority of
senators to block the majority from confirming nominations. Fair is fair—the
President should also be allowed some increased latitude on recess appointments to
compensate. Some might assert, nonetheless, that the Supreme Court should not
participate in such a clear change in the constitutional order. But despite our
reverence for the document, the Court has sanctioned or created a number of
fundamental changes since the founding. Perhaps most important, it has approved
the transfer to executive offices and independent agencies of the power to create
binding legislative rules and to adjudicate cases involving private parties. 124
Without this modification of the traditional three-branch governmental structure,
the administrative state as we know it would be impossible. The Court has also
allowed a substantial diminution of the Senate’s power to approve treaties by
allowing the President to enter into executive agreements having the same legal
effect 125 and approving presidential power to terminate treaties without Senate
approval. 126 Likewise, it has allowed the President to exercise quasi-legislative
powers directly through executive orders. 127 The Court has even reinterpreted
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constitutional text to virtually eliminate the President’s pocket veto power. The list
is a long one, but suffice it to say that there is ample precedent for recognizing that
the Recess Appointments Clause has changed drastically since 1789 in practical
operation, but still retains its crucial importance in the Constitution.
Where can the Court look for guidance in interpreting the Recess
Appointments Clause so that it functions effectively in the twenty-first century?
The closest analogy is probably the federal court decisions on the Constitution’s
pocket veto provision. The Supreme Court in Wright v. United States 128 and the
D.C. Circuit in Kennedy v. Sampson 129 confronted the question of when the Senate
has prevented the return of a bill under the veto provisions of the Constitution.
Those courts found that though the Senate was not in session during the time the
President would have to have returned a bill to exercise his veto, it had not
prevented the return because it had appointed an officer to receive presidential
communications and the Senate’s administrative offices were open and
functioning. Their holdings would seem at first blush to support the Senate’s
argument that pro forma sessions can be effective in negating the recess
appointment power. But a closer analysis reveals something else. The crucial act in
question in these cases was merely the notification by the President of his veto. No
Senate action was required, and it had an indefinite time to exercise its power,
along with the House, to override the veto. The Court’s pragmatic approach,
emphasizing the fact that many Senate functions, such as receiving messages,
could be performed by designated staff, effectively modernized the constitutional
provision. Applying the same reasoning to the pro forma session, the Court would
have to recognize that the acts needing to be performed are debate and vote on the
nomination, which require the Senate to be in an actual session. Following its
functional approach, it would ask whether the Senate could perform the function
required and would find that it could not. Thus, as the OLC memo supporting
President Obama’s recess appointments argues, a pro forma session sufficient to
negate the President’s pocket veto might well be insufficient to prevent a recess
appointment. 130
A closer analogy for the Court to use is the line of cases involving the
President’s removal of federal officers. After experimenting with dividing
appointees into different categories to determine whether the Senate could restrict
the President’s removal power, the Court in Morrison v. Olson 131 settled on a more
amorphous functional test—such restrictions were not constitutional if they
impaired the ability of the President to execute the laws or “disrupt[] the balance
between the coordinate branches.” 132 This line of cases could well support an
analysis by the Court that placed prime emphasis on the ability of the President to
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carry out the laws and the need to preserve the recess appointment power in its
modern form.
The Court’s seminal decision in INS v. Chadha 133 should also figure in its
analysis of issues under the Recess Appointments Clause. There the Court
resoundingly rejected a one-house legislative veto of an executive action because it
had the effect of legislation while not following the constitutional requirements of
passage by both houses and presentment to the President. 134 Some may argue that
the Court’s rejection of the arguments that one-house vetoes in statutes were
acquiesced in by both branches, and had existed in great numbers for some time,
will lead the Court to reject the importance of historical practice which is arguably
at odds with the text of the Recess Appointments Clause. But there are several
important differences. First, legislative vetoes, while numerous, were seldom used
and could not be seen as a crucial issue in relations between the President and
Congress. Second, there was no textual ambiguity in Chadha while there is in this
case. Third, acquiescence by both branches is much clearer in the recess
appointments case. Fourth, the historical practice on the textual issues, bolstered by
court decisions, was of a much longer duration—since 1823 on one and at least
1921 on another. Finally, the legislative veto went to the very heart of the
enactment process, which is a key element in the carefully balanced democratic
policy-making process created by the Constitution. The Appointments Clause is
clearly an area of shared power, like the War Power, and some ambiguity and
accommodation between the branches is to be expected. The most important lesson
of Chadha is directly relevant to the issues presented by Noel Canning and
senatorial efforts to stifle the recess appointments power. The underlying teaching
of Chadha is that Congress’s role is to pass laws and the President’s is to carry out
the laws—the one-house veto gave one house of the Congress the power to
participate in the execution of the laws passed by Congress. Yet that is exactly
what the Senate has attempted to do when in the current controversies involving
the CFPB, the NLRB, and Treasury policies during the financial crisis. Even
worse, the current situation allows a minority in the Senate, because of that body’s
peculiar rules and traditions, to exercise the advice-and-consent power in an
unconstitutional manner.
The Court should recognize that the narrow holdings of the Noel Canning
panel and the Senate’s recent use of pro forma sessions for the sole purpose of
blocking recess appointments have created a dangerous imbalance in the
continuing struggle over executive appointments. Accordingly, it should adopt the
broader approach to the textual issues taken by the circuits in Evans v. Stephens,
United States v. Woodley, 135 and United States v. Allocco. 136 Based on the textual
ambiguity, historical practice acquiesced in by the branches, and most importantly
on the overriding goal of the recess appointments clause, the Supreme Court
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should hold that recess appointments can be made during both intersession and
intrasession recesses and that the vacancies involved need not have occurred
during the recess. It should recognize that there is no functional difference between
the two and that the Framers did not anticipate the emergence of two different
types of recesses.
A much more difficult question is how to resolve the question of whether
there is a lower limit to the length of a recess during which a president may make
an appointment. The Court could simply leave that question to the President and
Congress as a matter of political accommodation, like the current unofficial limit
of ten days. But it would be far better if the Court gave the parties some guidance
on this point as well. It could start by recognizing the established distinction in the
Senate’s own rules and traditions between daily recesses—overnight and over a
weekend, for example—and annual recesses, which are breaks in the annual
session itself. That would make it clear that the President could not make recess
appointments at midnight between daily sessions of the Senate. It could, as many
commentators have done, draw on the Adjournment Clause to hold that recesses of
less than three days, since they require approval of the other House, are not
constitutionally significant, and thus may not be used to make a recess
appointment. The logic connecting the two clauses is questionable, but in fact the
three days is significant in Senate rules and practices distinguishing between daily
and annual recesses. It has the advantage of setting a reasonable lower limit, and
one that few presidents have tried to breach.
On the issue of pro forma sessions, I would suggest it set a clear guideline that
brings the Quorum Clause of the Constitution and Senate practice into play by
holding that the recess appointment power is triggered when the Senate fails to
convene a quorum (a majority of its members) or perform any official business for
four consecutive calendar days, Sundays not included. Therefore, the Senate could
nullify the recess appointment power if it stayed in actual session at all times (a
practical impossibility), but it could not do so by pretending to be in session when
it is not.
Supreme Court action to clarify definitively the crucial constitutional issues,
however, will not be enough to restore balance to the process of executive
appointments. The Senate and the President should also consider entering into an
agreement, embodied either in rules or in a Sense of the Senate Resolution, and a
formal presidential statement, that codifies best practices in the appointments
process. The agreement must be balanced, with each side receding from some of
the practices that have aggravated the relationship. As this Article was being
prepared for publication, the Senate, in a truly historic moment, amended its rules
by majority vote to curtail the filibuster.137 It eliminated the sixty-vote requirement
for confirmation of executive officers and judges other than Justices of the
Supreme Court. It is too early to assess the long-term effect of this change, which
137
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has been threatened often by both parties. Nominations can theoretically move
faster, though the minority still has many tools for delaying votes because of the
complexity of Senate rules and traditions, and may now have special motivation to
use them aggressively. 138 Only time will tell whether traditions like holds and
senatorial courtesy will be preserved. 139 Future Senate majorities will be freer to
make further changes in the confirmation rules. Moreover, it is important to note
that filibuster reform does not help a president who faces a hostile Senate majority
of the other party; there recess appointments are a vital tool.
The Senate should still adopt requirements for the efficient handling of
executive nominations. I would suggest that committees be required to report
nominations within a set time, perhaps three months, and that floor votes be
required within a set time thereafter, perhaps one month. The Senate should also
agree not to manipulate its convening and adjournment practices, as it tried to do
with pro forma sessions, for the sole purpose of blocking recess appointments.
These changes and commitments would be contingent on the President’s pledge to
limit certain of her recess appointment options. These could include a commitment
not to make a recess appointment of a person unless he or she had earlier been
nominated for the same position and nominated at least four months before a
recess appointment is made. The President should also commit to informing the
Senate in writing of her intention to make a recess appointment at least thirty days
before a recess, though that could turn out to be difficult. She could also pledge not
to make a recess appointment in cases where the Senate has rejected the person in
question for the same office after a floor vote governed by simple majority rule.
Finally, the President might well want to reiterate her commitment not to make
recess appointments during recesses of fewer than ten days. It would also be wise
for the President to improve the process of vetting nominees after each election
and for the Congress to provide additional funds to staff such personnel
operations. 140
If the Supreme Court were to clarify the constitutional issues, and the two
branches would adhere to a series of sensible guidelines, the current crisis in the
executive appointments process could be eased. The President would still be able
to make recess appointments when the Senate refused to act or attempted to use the
appointments process for improper or irrelevant ends. The Senate’s advice-andconsent function would be strengthened because recess appointment would usually
not be necessary. Within the Senate, the proper role of majority rule would be
restored in this area, as the Framers undoubtedly intended.
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Preserving the President’s ability to act decisively in executing the laws and
carrying out the policies on which he or she was elected is even more important
now when the Congress is in such disarray. A combination of political
polarization, intensely partisan tactics, and antiquated rules has made it nearly
impossible for the Congress to address legislatively the important issues now
facing the country. Though there is admittedly some danger in excessive
presidential power, modern chief executives have successfully resorted to
administrative action as a substitute for legislation when urgent action is required.
Narrowing or destroying the recess appointment power could have the effect of
spreading the contagion of inaction from the legislative to the executive branch, to
the ultimate detriment of the country.

